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Introduction
There has been extensive recent debate on the success or otherwise of 'multiculturalism'. On one side has been the claim that the multiculturalist project can incorporate diverse populations within a common framework (Kymlicka 1996; Modood 2007; Parekh 2000) . On the other, there has been an explicit anxiety about the extent to which multicultural responses to diversity foster exclusive minority and religious identities and undermine common cause (Cameron 2011; Huntington 1993) . The endorsement of national identity by minorities is often taken to be an indicator of their incorporation into the receiving country society, and to represent both acceptance of shared national values and implicit rejection of ethnic or cultural distinctiveness (Reeskens and Wright 2013) . Conversely, maintenance of strong ethnic identities is read as problematic for an integrated society and a challenge to a national consensus.
There are, however, two features of this second narrative that merit further interrogation.
First, ethnic and national identities are not mutually exclusive, since identities are not necessarily binary or oppositional (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007) . Moreover, the evidence is unclear on whether greater diversity reduces national belonging (Masella 2013) . Second, the emphasis on the significance of national identification assumes that such an identity is endorsed by the population as a whole and represents a consensus of values. This assumption is also open to question (Kiely, McCrone and Bechhofer 2005) . This paper explores both of these assumptions using the case of the UK, capitalising on a unique, nationally representative data source to analyse identification of both minorities and the majority. We utilise and extend Berry's acculturation framework (Berry 1997) , applying the concept of identity acculturation not only to the extent to which minorities maintain single or dual identities, but also to diversity in identities among the White majority population. We exploit the fact that the UK's majority population comprises English, Welsh, Scots and Northern Irish, and investigate variation in identification with each of these identities and/or with an overarching British national identity. We are thus able to advance understanding of ethnic and national identities across the whole population.
We also aim to expand the quantitative evidence base on correlates of variations in national identity across ethnic groups and generations, particularly given debates around how education and socio-economic status vary with national identification (Kesler and Schwartzman 2014) . We argue that when people have other secure sources of identification, such as those offered through higher education or occupational status, they may feel less invested in national identities (Nandi and Platt 2012) . We also evaluate how far age, sex, immigrant generation (for minorities), and within-UK country of birth (for the majority) influence the extent to which national and ethnic identities are experienced as salient (Bechhofer and McCrone 2012; Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Jaspal and Cinnirella 2013; Maxwell 2006; Platt 2014) . We additionally test for the contributory role of experience of harassment among minorities, since feelings of acceptance have been shown to correlate with feelings of belonging (Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Maxwell 2006; Fischer-Neuman 2013;  Crul and Schneider 2010); and we address the role of political engagement in contributing to identity expression (Heath et al. 2013; Verkuyten and Reijerse 2008) .
We find that, after controlling for relevant factors, second generation minorities typically have stronger British identities than the White majority, and in a number of cases so also do the first generation. Minorities most commonly have strong dual ethnic and national identities. UK-born minorities are less likely to hold minority only identities than their immigrant counterparts and more likely to hold British-only identities, while the shares with both weak minority and British and strong dual identities remain relatively constant across the generations. There is some variation across ethno-religious groups with the largest share of strong dual identities among Indian Sikhs and the smallest among Other White, Caribbean Christian groups.
Among the White majority, single English, Scottish, Welsh, Northern Irish identities are the most common, with certain exceptions: a sole British identity is dominant among Northern Irish Protestants. Political commitment has no substantial independent influence on elective identities, unlike socio-demographic factors, possibly suggesting that such attachments represent less civic and more 'ethnic' nationalism (Smith 1991) .
We return to these points in our conclusion, where we consider their implications and reflect on the extent to which the specific UK case may also hold lessons for other countries.
Background
In the context of increasing immigration and the changing composition of European populations, there has been extensive debate on the consequences of increasingly multicultural societies and the success or otherwise of 'multiculturalism' as a political project (Koopmans 2013; Kymlicka 1996) . Modood (2007) regards multiculturalism as combining recognition of groups' difference with assertion of a common national identity, implying the possibility of harmonious dual identities. However, there have been ongoing debates about the extent to which group recognition is compatible with the egalitarian principles of liberal democracies (Barry 2001 ). Huntington's (1993) claim that there are limits to the extent that it is possible for different 'cultures' to co-exist has found resonance in the political retreat from multiculturalism (Koopmans 2013) and anxiety about a fundamental incompatibility between difference and shared identity (Verkuyten and Zaremba 2005) . For example, in UK political discourse, multiculturalism has been linked with separatism, religious fundamentalism, and alienation from core national values (Cameron 2011) , with failure to accede to British national identity seen as a particular issue for the second generation of minorities.
In the face of strong academic as well as political conviction that national identity is central to social cohesion (Moran 2011; Reeskens and Wright 2014) , the quantitative evidence base relating to minority or immigrant national identification and its correlates and consequences has been growing (e.g. Lam and Smith 2010; Diehl and Schnell 2006; Fischer-Neuman 2013; Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Kesler and Schwartzman 2014) . Much of the focus has been on the experience of minorities specifically and their in-group or out-group identification.
Additionally, some studies have also compared minorities with majority, and these suggest that immigrant minorities' national identification is as great as that of the majority, albeit with some variation across groups (Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Karlsen and Nazroo 2013; Manning and Roy 2010; Masella 2013; Reeskens and Wright 2014) . A nascent literature on generational change in identity in the UK suggests that across minority groups the tendency is for national identity to increase with time and generation, while minority identity declines (Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Guveli and Platt 2011; Platt 2014; Karlsen and Nazroo 2013; Manning and Roy 2010) .
However, despite these suggestive insights, existing research, both qualitative and quantitative, often includes only partial coverage of ethnic groups, with much of the current literature focusing on Muslim groups and single generations (e.g. Jacobson 1997; Vadher and Barrett 2009; Lam and Smith 2010) . Moreover, the focus on minority identity integration or assimilation has tended to obscure the analysis of national identity among the dominant group itself, which has, instead, been the focus of separate study (see e.g. Bechhofer and McCrone 2012; Kiely, McCrone and Bechhofer 2005) . However, majority identification is a critical part of the context for minorities: the extent to which minority groups' identity claims are accepted may impact on the degree to which they feel able to make them (Crul and Schneider 2010) . At the same time, shifts in the meaning of national identity resulting from changing national composition may be implicated in the extent to which the majority themselves identify with an overarching polity (Gong 2007) .
It is, therefore, pertinent to contextualise minority diversity within the diversity of the majority population identification. Identity acculturation is not a one-sided process (Berry 1997) , and the relations implied within the process of assimilation are not singular (Brubaker 2001) . The potential of national identity effectively to accommodate minority or immigrant groups is an important component of the extent to which minorities can and will identify with it (Moran 2011) . While Scottish identity is being recast as a more 'inclusive' identity (Bechhofer and McCrone 2012) , the 'rise' of English identity (Wyn Jones et al. 2012 ) may herald a redrawing of national boundaries to a more 'ethnic' conception of nation (Smith 1991) , with consequences for its inclusivity (Reeskens and Wright 2013) .
We therefore conceptualize minority and majority identity within an acculturation framework which describes the changes that take place in cultural patterns for either group when two differentiated groups come into contact (Berry 1997) . In this paper we focus on Berry's model of psychological acculturation at the level of individual identity which distinguishes between assimilation, integration, separation and marginalisation.
While there is considerable debate around concepts of assimilation and integration (Alba and Nee 1997; Brubaker 2001; Rumbaut 1997) , whether in relation to structural or cultural domains, Berry's four-way categorisation provides us with a widely accepted nomenclature for describing particular intersections on the two axes of ethnic and national identity. Much of the discussion around assimilation has been concerned either with distinguishing its normative from its descriptive aspects (see e.g. Brubaker 2001) or assessing whether its predictions do indeed materialise (e.g. Rumbaut 1997) . In this paper we use the term assimilation descriptively to define those for whom British national identity predominates.
Integration has been subject to similar critiques as 'assimilation', though, following Berry's terminology, we are operationalising it as representing dual identity. In the same way, separation and marginalisation are used as descriptors of predominantly strong ethnic identity, and low national and ethnic identification respectively. While Berry's framework is well-recognised and has been used in other work on ethnic identity and multiculturalism (see e.g. Diehl and Schnell 2006; Heath and Demireva 2013; Fischer-Neuman 2014) , our approach extends existing research in two ways. First, for analysing minority group acculturation, we utilise comparable scaled measures of both national and ethnic identity that are collected independently and tap into affective but individualised dimensions of identity (Phinney 1992). We are thus able to develop previous literature exploring binary measures of national identity that may be associated with legal citizenship (Manning and Roy 2010; Platt 2014) , and capture a more affective component (Reeskens and Wright 2014) . We also are able to focus on identity rather than related concepts such as belonging (Burton, Nandi and Platt 2010) , as used, for example by Georgiadis and Manning (2013) and Maxwell (2006) , or connection to a particular country (Fisher-Neuman 2014) .
In operationalising this framework and investigating patterns of identification, we are adopting a concept of identity that is deemed to be stable at the point of analysis, even though we recognise that identity is contingent and subject to interpretation and hence is differentially adopted and adapted (see e.g. the discussion in Lam and Smith 2010; and Verkuyten and Reijerse 2008) . As noted by Tajfel (1981) , social identity is formed and expressed under specific historical, cultural and ideological conditions, and the current configuration in the UK marks an interesting case for investigating identities.
The second innovation is that we introduce a comparative analysis of the majority population within the same framework as that for minorities. This allows us to engage with the heterogeneity of the majority rather than representing it as a monolithic, normative reference point. It takes seriously the imperatives of the new assimilation theory (Alba and Nee 1997) and of acculturation theory to acknowledge that these processes are two-sided.
From the extant literature, we hypothesise that minorities in the UK will have national identities as strong as or stronger than the majority, but that they will vary by group (Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Jaspal and Cinnirella 2013; Manning and Roy 2010; Maxwell 2006) . We expect that British national identity will be stronger in the second generation; but will also be sensitive to the responses of the majority (Heath et al. 2013 ) and hence be reduced by harassment. We also anticipate that national and ethnic identities will be reinforcing, leading to an over-representation of 'integrated' (dual) identities. We expect separated (ethnic only) identities to decline across generations with a commensurate increase in assimilated (British only) identities.
Among the majority, we expect the key influence on the patterning of identity will be country-specific national-religious origins. Specifically, we anticipate strongest 'separated' identification among Scots (Bechhofer and McCrone 2012) and greater attachment to British (integrated or assimilated) identities among Northern Irish Protestants.
We nevertheless anticipate that socio-demographics will be associated with different identity patterns across both minorities and majority. Among minorities, those with lower socio-economic status and lower educational levels and those who are older would be expected to have more invested in national (British) identity (Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Maxwell 2006) , as those with more privileged positions have had more opportunities to "select" their identities (Kesler and Schwartzman 2014; Nandi and Platt 2012) . Among the majority, we anticipate that lower socio-economic status and being older will instead be linked to country level identities as a more local point of validation. We anticipate that mainstream political engagement is liable to increase investment in assimilated and integrated identities among minorities; while, in the face of greater debate over devolution and country identities (Bechhofer and McCrone 2012) , it will be more closely linked to separated identities among the majority.
Data and Measures

Data
We use data from Understanding Society, a UK longitudinal survey of a nationally representative sample of approximately 28,000 households, with an additional ethnic minority boost sample (EMB) of around 4,000 households (Knies 2014). The EMB contributed around 1,000 adult interviews of five target ethnic minority groups (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black African, Caribbean) in addition to those covered in the main sample. Every year the adult (16+) household members are asked about their lives. In addition to questions on socio-demographic characteristics, the survey includes questions on attitudes and identity, including political beliefs, Britishness, strength of identification with parents' ethnic group and national identity. Some of these questions (which we call 'extra questions') are asked only of a) the EMB, b) a comparison sample of 500 households from the main sample, and c) ethnic minorities living in 'low-density' areas not covered by the EMB. This rich set of identity questions, the representative UK coverage, the large sample size and the EMB makes Understanding Society uniquely suited for this analysis.
We use the UK 2011 Census question to identify White majority (as those choosing White:
British/English/Scottish/Welsh/Northern Irish category) and minority (those choosing any of the other categories) groups.
Dependent variables: British, ethnic and national identity
National identity: The entire sample was asked a standard Census question on national identity: respondents selected one or more national identity from English, Welsh, Scottish, Northern Irish, British, Irish and Other. Each could be chosen singly or in combination.
British identity:
Those eligible for the 'extra questions' were asked "how important being British" was to them. They were shown an 11-point-scale where higher on the scale was "more important" and chose their position on it.
Ethnic identity: Minority group members eligible for 'extra questions' were additionally asked to give the strength of identification with their father's ethnic group and with their mother's ethnic group (if different), using a similar format and 11-point scale. We use this as our measure of minority ethnic identity, prioritising the highest score where responses on mother and father differed.
Independent variables
Ethno-religious group: The ethnic group categories in the 2011 Census questions are widely used, but have been criticised for conflating groups with different migration and settlement histories and different patterns of association, which are often linked in practice to religious distinctions: for example, Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus of Indian origin (see e.g. Longhi et al. 2013 ). An alternative is to construct ethno-religious groups, which has the additional advantage that it enables the concurrent incorporation of ethnicity and religious affiliation into the measure. We use current religion or, if no current religion, the religion respondents were brought up in alongside the Census ethnic group categories to construct a 17-category measure of ethno-religious group. i Country-community origin: For majority group analysis, we constructed a measure of country-community origins that combined country of birth (whether England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland or elsewhere ii ) with religious affiliation / community of upbringing (Catholic, Protestant, or other or none). From this we derived a nine-category measure that distinguished religion / religious community for Scotland and Northern Ireland, where it is most likely to be salient for national identity, but not for England, Wales or Other.
Other covariates
Demographic variables: We include age measured in six bands, and sex, along with marital/ cohabitation status, measured as single never married, cohabiting, married or in a civil partnership, separated widowed or divorced. We also include region of residence.
UK-born:
We include a measure of immigrant generation, identified by whether UK-born (second or subsequent generation) or not (first generation) in the minority group analysis.
Socio-economic position:
To investigate whether identity varied with socio-economic position, we included measures of highest qualification (four categories), employment status, and occupational class as measured by the eight-category National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (Rose, Pevalin and O'Reilly 2005) .
Political engagement:
We utilise a measure of political party affiliation, both strong and weak, to capture political engagement in the minority group analysis. Given that the vast majority affiliate to one of the UK-wide national parties (cf. Heath et al. 2013) , this takes the form of a 7-category variable of none/not-eligible to vote, and strong and weak Conservative, Labour and Other party supporter. In the majority analysis, given that different political parties operate in the different countries of the UK, we use a three-category general measure of political support i.e. whether supported any party strongly or weakly or not at all.
Harassment:
In the minority group analyses, we include a three-category measure of no harassment, direct experience of physical or verbal harassment and feeling unsafe.
Analytical approach
We first examine our hypotheses that strength of British identity is as great or greater among minorities as among the majority, but with some diversity across groups. As this question was one of the "extra questions", we are left with a sample (Sample 1) of N=7,762 of whom 14 per cent are White majority. We regress British identity on ethno-religious group and the full set of covariates using Ordinary Least Squares regression. Using Sample 1, our reference population for ethno-religious group is White Christian majority.
For the analysis of both minority and majority acculturation we adopt -and adapt -Berry's four-way acculturation framework. Berry and Sam (1997) identified four potential pathways that behavioural and identity acculturation could take: assimilation, integration, separation and marginalisation. As noted, we use these labels as analytical descriptors of particular positions on the two axes of national and ethnic identity rather than as normative categories (cf. Brubaker 2001) . The framework with these labels is illustrated schematically in the top panel of Figure 1 .
For the analysis of minority acculturation, we allocate minority group individuals to the four levels of the quadrant based on the measures of ethnic and British identity. We distinguish strong and weak identification by whether responses fall above or below the median value.
These questions were part of the "extra questions" and we are thus left with a minority-only sample (Sample 2) of N=6,490. This allocation and the ensuing distribution are illustrated in the second panel of Figure 1 .
iii While the use of the median is essentially arbitrary (Berry and Sabatier 2010) , the fact that it splits the population equally means that if there were no association between the strength of the two identities, we would expect to find 25 per cent of the sample in each cell. If there was a negative relationship between the two identities, there would be over-representation in the assimilated and separated cells. In fact, it is the integrated cell that shows over-representation, indicating that those who identify strongly on one measure are more likely to identify strongly on the other.
We model these four outcomes by estimating a multinomial logistic regression model on our second sample, with 'separated' as the reference category, and including the full set of covariates.
To model the White majority's identity acculturation, we utilise responses to the multicode measure of national identity, described above. We are thus left with a sample (Sample 3) of N=35,617 White majority respondents. Respondents are allocated to the integrated category if they claim both a British and (English/Welsh/Scottish/ Northern Irish) country-level identity, as separated if they claim a country identity only, assimilated if they claim a British identity only and marginalised if they do not claim any UK country or British identity. This last group is a small residual group, as the third panel of Figure 1 shows, and includes those who describe their national identity as Irish as well as some who identify with another country, despite claiming White -British/ English/ Scottish/ Welsh/ Northern Irish as their ethnic group. Since the allocation is based on a different measure and cannot be constructed to be evenly split across the two axes, it is not directly comparable with the measure of acculturation used in the minority group analysis. Nevertheless, it indicates the priority accorded by the majority to different identity options, which provides important context for the minority choices. It also allows investigation of whether predictors of different acculturation outcomes are consistent or differ across minorities and majority.
We again estimate multinomial logit models for the relative chance of being in the integrated, assimilated or marginalized categories relative to being in the separated group, exploring differences between country-community origins compared to the reference category of English origins.
To facilitate interpretation of the multinomial logistic regressions, we provide tables of predicted probabilities of the four outcomes to illustrate the average marginal effects of certain key predictors of interest, including ethno-religious group and country-community origin.
All estimations are weighted using household design weights, and standard errors estimated correctly by accounting for the complex survey design. Descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis for each of the three samples are provided in the supplemental material, as Appendix: Table A1 .
Minority ethnic identity and acculturation
We first address the question of how British identity varies across ethno-religious groups. Table 1 shows the results from the full OLS model. (TABLE 1) After adjusting for covariates, Caribbean Christians, those of mixed ethnicity and the various 'other' groups, were not significantly different from the White Christian majority in their strength of British identification. Only the Other White group had a significantly less strong British identity while all other ethno-religious groups expressed a stronger British identity. A difference of more than one point on the 11-point scale was found for Indian, Pakistani,
Bangladeshi and Black African Muslims and Indian Sikhs and less than one point for Indian
Hindus and Black African Christians. These differences are consistent with our hypotheses derived from related literature using different data and measures. Notably, however, here we use a direct measure of national identity that better reflects its conceptualisation in the literature, and a more fine-grained and comprehensive ethnic group categorisation that reveals consistency but also differences within the Indian population as well as the high British identification of Black African Christians. Some of the difference in British identification between ethno-religious groups is explained by differences in their political affiliation and support. Once the political support variable was included, ethno-religious group coefficients were attenuated. Political support, whether strong or weak, for either of the two main political parties (Labour and Conservative) was positively associated with British identification, though this was not the case for support for an alternative party. This suggests that engagement with national politics reinforces feelings of being part of the nation, but only when that engagement is mainstream.
Being UK-born was positively associated with British identification, as expected. In addition, higher qualifications, iv being from a professional occupation, being younger and being a student were negatively associated with Britishness, while a semi-routine or routine occupation or being long-term unemployed were positively associated, illustrating the greater salience of national identity in the absence of competing professional identities, in line with our hypotheses. Congruent with expectations, experience of harassment was negatively associated with British identity.
This analysis is not, however, informative about the relationship between British and ethnic identity. For that, we turn to our multinomial logit model of identity acculturation among the minority groups. The exception to predominance of integrated identities is among those of Other White backgrounds, for which 'marginalised' (weak ethnic and British identity) is the most frequent outcome. Other White is a composite group, which contains multiple 'white' origins.
Nevertheless, these findings speak to the greater independence from commitment to ethnic or national identity offered by the greater flexibility and transnational opportunities offered by most Other White backgrounds, whether of EU, North American or Antipodean origins.
Caribbeans, though coming from a very different migration context, have a similar pattern of relatively low integrated acculturation outcomes to the Other White group (though for them it is still the most likely outcome) and relatively high rates of marginalised identities across generations, higher than would come from random allocation. This is consistent with the findings on relative alienation found by Heath and Demireva (2014) , and is a potential concerns if strong identity in at least in one of the domains is important for psychological well-being.
Having a solely strong British identity ("assimilated") is less common, as expected, among first generation minorities, but increases in the second generation to around one in five for most groups. Correspondingly, separated (strong ethnic only) identities are more common in the first generation and decline among the UK born, though they still constitute between one in eight and one in five of most groups. These individual are those, who, controlling for background characteristics, might be considered to have failed to take on and accord with the 'national story' of their country of birth and residence. However, the overall distributions are partly an artefact of the distinction between "high" and "low" at the median: and the rates are still lower than would be expected from random allocation (which would give 25 per cent in each category).
For those second generation who are 'separated', there is no particularly ethno-religious group pattern, with Caribbean and African Christians, Indian Hindus and Chinese with no religion the most likely to be in this position. While the rates of marginalisation show variation across groups there is relative stability over generations. Against expectations, marginalisation does not, therefore, appear to be a particular issue of the second generation but is more group-than generation-specific. We now turn to the patterns among the White majority. Table 3 shows that, controlling for covariates, almost all country-community groups select a separated (country only) identity as their modal choice. That is, given the option to select a single British or country identity or a multiple identity, most selected a single country. The exception, in line with expectations, is Northern Irish Protestants for whom the modal category is, rather, assimilated (British only). This was also the preferred option for those who had a non-UK country of birth, who had a fairly bimodal distribution, being very unlikely to select two UK identities. Contrary to expectations deriving from the closelyfought referendum on independence, the Scots were no more likely than the Welsh to have separated identities, and slightly less likely than Northern Irish Catholics.
Majority population and identity acculturation
While English-born are just as likely to have integrated (British and English) as assimilated identities, Scots (both Protestant and Catholic) and Welsh have lower rates of assimilated identities. However, interestingly, Northern Irish Catholics are more likely to have assimilated than integrated identities. They are also the only group with a non-negligible share (5 per cent) in the marginalized (neither identity) category. This tends to be because these respondents select Irish, so it should not be interpreted as lacking an ethnic/country identity, but rather as not holding any UK identity. Nevertheless the proportion maintaining this 'alternative' identity is still small, perhaps surprisingly given historical ties to the republic.
Turning to other covariates (not illustrated), higher educational qualifications were associated with a greater chance of selecting a British identity (whether integrated or assimilated)
relative to holding a country-only identity (separated). Thus, as hypothesised, country identities would seem to offer more to the majority population in the absence of external validation offered by higher socio-economic status, whereas for minorities, it was British identity that seemed to invite greater investment among the less privileged.
Political engagement (illustrated in Table 3 ) was less strongly associated with majority identity choices, despite the intensity of political debate around devolution (and independence). In fact, while (any) party support was significantly associated with a lower likelihood of an integrated relative to a separated identity, compared to those without any party affiliation the differences were small. No other political affiliation differences were statistically significant. Thus, political engagement and identity do not seem as closely interconnected as they were for minorities, though the inability to distinguish parties in this multi-country framework may have somewhat disguised the relationship with specific party support.
Summary and conclusions
Minorities' identification with the majority society in which they live is widely regarded as an important indicator of cohesion and of successfully integrated societies. There have been claims that multiculturalist policies have inhibited such identification and thus created alienation and exacerbated cultural conflict. However, these claims involve assumptions both about the incompatibility of ethnic and national identities, and about the coherence of national identity claims. Minorities have been the explicit targets of concerns about lack of national identification and the failure of multiculturalist policies to create a coherent sense of national belonging (Huntington 1993; Heath and Demireva 2014; Koopmans 2013; Verkuyten and Zaremba 2005 ), yet it is not clear that majorities themselves sign up to national identity in systematic or consistent ways.
We therefore set out to investigate these two issues by analysing British national identity across the UK's minority and majority groups, taking into account other relevant influences.
Competing identities for the majority in a context such as the UK are offered by country level identities, which can be considered more ethnic than civic national identities. By using a similar framework for analysing majority dual and single identification as for minorities, we shed greater light on the extent to which national identity is or is not central to majority society.
We hypothesised that minority groups' British identity would be as strong as or stronger than the majority population; and we found this was the case. In particular, minorities were likely to hold strong dual (ethnic minority and British national) identities. We also expected differences across ethnic groups, and we found substantial differences in identity, but without any systematic pattern, other than the greater tendency of Other White and Caribbean groups to lack strong ethnic or national identification.
Amid increasing interest in the 'second generation' (Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Heath, Rothon and Kilpi 2008) , we demonstrated that while generational change in the patterning of identities was more of a continuum than a step change, it was clearly in the direction of maintaining majority identities more and minority ones less, while dual identities were relatively stable.
There is substantial heterogeneity in identity formation and strength across ethnic minority groups and within the UK majority. Minorities are, nevertheless, largely signed up to the "national story" represented by British identity. However, as around half of the majority population endorse solely country-specific identities when given the choice, this national story may in fact be less unitary and more fractured. We further revealed how lower socioeconomic status influences identity patterning across both majority and minorities, but is linked more to British identity among minorities and more to 'ethnic' country-level identities among the majority. The implication is that over time, as educational levels increase, we might expect some convergence in levels of British identification. But questions over the overarching coherence of the category will remain.
For the majority, political investment is positively associated with country-specific rather than British identities and thus the mutual reinforcement is in the direction of ethnic rather than civic conceptions of nation, while the civic nation increasingly captures the endorsement of minority groups. Rather than stressing national identity as a marker of cohesion, a more productive path in the medium term towards enhancing common points of identification may be to focus on the civic inclusiveness of sub-national categories (cf. Crul and Schneider 2010).
While our analysis was specific to the UK context, our results may be relevant to Europewide analysis of identity. First, we have contributed to the evidence base around the relationship between education / socio-economic position and national and ethnic identity, which has been subject to debate and different findings across studies. Second, we show how there is a clear shift across immigrant generations in patterns of identity acculturation, even given differences between groups. Third, we show how this strengthening of national identity over generations is occurring in the context of an apparent retreat among the majority population from an overarching national identification. While this may in some part be due to the specific context of devolution in the UK, it indicates the broader need to reconsider national identification as a straightforward marker of cohesion (Reeskins and Wright 2013a), and instead to debate how it is 'owned' across populations.
Notes
i More detailed information on the construction of this variable is available on request.
ii Given the focus on those who identified as White majority, the number born outside the UK was relatively small, around 2 per cent of this sample.
iii We tried an alternative definition of strong and weak identification: using scores of 6 and above on the 11-point scale to represent strong identification. More than 50 per cent of individuals choose scores that are greater than the mid-point of the scale and, as a result, when we used this alternative definition, the number of people categorised as having a strong identification with their parents' ethnic group increased by 11 percentage points and those having a strong identification with British identity increased by 17 percentage points. The resulting distribution of acculturation identities according to Berry's framework is shown in the supplemental material, Appendix: Figure A1 . While using this alternative definition may be beneficial for future international comparisons based on identity ratings, it does not have the nice interpretation of the median cut-off for this paper, which illustrates how far from a random distribution of responses, respondents' identity choices are. iv We also interact this with an ethnic minority dummy variable and find that both this result holds for both the White majority and ethnic minorities; but the difference across educational groups (tertiary vs others) is higher among the White majority than ethnic minorities (see Appendix: Table A2 ). v Results based on the model using the alternative definition of strength of identification showed that the pattern remained almost the same, even though the exact proportions differed: see Appendix Table A3 . An exception was that the probability of choosing a marginalized identity vis-a-vis a separated identity did not differ across different political affiliations. Notes: weighted using household design weights, standard errors estimated correctly by accounting for the complex survey design 
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